Kent:  If any relationship, aspect or attribute that exists in the universe is of more value, use, or worth to humanity than another then some sort of rational order, that of value, exists as physical reality exists

John:  Do you see a non-rational order (that we could develop a human framework of value within) as appearing impossible as a viable alternative?

Kent: That is awkward wording, John, not sure I understand. Do you think we make the order ourselves but that what exists is random? I suppose that would be testable.  Or an order that is non-rational? How would that work? If we can’t make sense out of it we can’t name it, use it, refer to it, or know it in any way.

John:  Yeah, the second one. So it sounds like you see it as impossible from where you stand at least for now when looking at the options. I’m actually curious if I can get you to see it as more possible.  What would you see as needing to be addressed the most? Pretty much what you shared above? Anything else come to mind?

Kent:  Like the difference between an unnamed, unformed, colorless shape, and a hammer. There is too much in my mind to say any of it is more urgent than any of the rest of it. Comes as a package. Once you understand it you will see things differently, or have the ability too. At least that was my experience.

John:  I’m going to make placeholder for something before people that a human can only describe through the limitations of a conceptual framework. I’ll label that placeholder: “actual”.

Back to a non-rational order what about explaining how it could be possible if people were making partial sense based on how it pertained to people out of the “actual”, by using “conceptual” frameworks?

 Let’s take the concepts of “near” and “far” for instance. Say before human life the universe is neither intrinsically near nor far. Say as a primitive protohuman, I observe that some food is easier to reach than others. I see that I’m in one place, and based on that spot, everything I observe is either easier to reach or harder. I start to use this to help me find food.

I’m interpreting what’s actual, in relationship to how I take in data, in that I’m living through a collection of set points in time and space.

Is that a viable scenario for an order that exists beyond the limitations of the concept of “rational”?

Kent: All the words you used to refer to the ideas that help you understand your surroundings are part of a rational framework. Whether or not the framework in our minds accurately reflects our surroundings we are still building a rational framework.

Whether or not the words we use are useful they are never completely accurate and are necessarily incomplete in their reflection of Rational Existence. We use a rational framework based on utility. Rational Existence will never be completely discovered / mapped./ modeled or otherwise known.

John:  Obviously. So why not say the same thing for “rational”? Why must we assume what is beyond us is “rational” just because we experience it through a conceptual set of lenses/rational framework?

Kent:  It seems quite reasonable to call the order we experience rationally as “rational order”. But if you have a better term please feel free to use it.

John:  I see rational as a specific type of “order”. It is being orderly within limited sight or knowledge.

I see it as specifically dealing with the alignment of our connections we draw to the order that we have already recognized.

For instance, a logical fallacy is in misalignment to consistencies we observe. Inconsistencies will fail us and reveal their lack of correspondence with the actual by doing so.

What do you think about “rational” as being a specific type of order that requires limited sight or knowledge?

Kent:  I wouldn’t say “requires” limited knowledge since all knowledge we know of is limited. Perhaps there exists an All-Knowing, but I thought your philosophy dis-allows such. I can understand a claim for a knowledge or rational order that we cannot understand but have no idea how to categorize such a thing.

John:  What I’m talking about is the human concept. What is rational except for ordering amidst limited knowledge? Why select for rational over simply “order”?

Kent:  I can’t think of any other kind of order. It is either rational order or random. What other kinds of order are there?  I suppose a rope could be considered a physical connection. But relationships, aspects and attributes of things are rational.

John:  Like obviously connectedness is what we observe, and that’s how we conceptualize that consistency we observe. But couldn’t we argue connectedness is a reliable translation of the “actual” that we draw from into making this concept of connectedness?

In terms of sets and subsets, If we look at the universe from the foundational lens of “connectedness” isn’t order then a type of connectedness? Do you see a way that it isn’t set and subset?

Here’s an example with “one” for visual. What’s in the center is what you can now use as a lens for discovery. If I re-did it I would make the center clear, since it’s more like looking through a telescope.

Obviously this lens narrows focus to something having to do with numbers. But we could swap out the image. “One” could be “connectedness” instead. “Amount” could be “Connectedness relating to structure/Order”. I would see rational as “Concept of order” overlapping the “concept of thinking”.

Actually that’s wrong. I was spacing out. I’d see it as it would be a single circle, rather than an overlap.

As in: (connectedness (order (thinking (rational))))

Kent:  The order I see in your explanations comes from the set / subset system. There are all kinds of orders and people make analogies applying one rational order and saying the present situation is LIKE this other situation. One such system is your set /subset ordering. It is more complicated than a normal analogy, like hair as dark as night, but still the same exposition of a type of order.

John:  Right, but then is rational actually anything other than a human way to apply a concept of order to “thinking”?

So what I’m arguing is we just call it order, rather than rational order.

Kent:  I’m okay with that. It is order that we discover rationally. The order is here before we discover it.

John:  Okay, so here’s where I think it gets interesting. If a foundational concept like “Connectedness” is wrong, how well does it work within the actual?

Kent:  The order has no physical existence.

So long as it works there is no problem. Like we see the color red, but actually strictly speaking we see the absence of red, and so red is reflected… Makes no functional difference.

John:  Right no concepts actually exist. But most concepts are subset concepts of a parent concept that is a subset of a foundational concept.

And what the foundational concept translates does exist.

Kent:  It is the opposite. Concepts are all that actually exist.  What we see is tempered, filtered, designed and taught to us by other humans as we grow and learn to function in a conceptual, rational world.

John: Well there’s a limitation to our language. That’s why I said let’s call “actual” our placeholder for that which exists before conceptualization.

So what the foundational concept translates into the conceptual is what is actual.

In other words, we can’t observe the “actual” except through the use of conceptual tools, but I’d argue that the tools are grounded in a solid enough translation of the actual that we can use it for relatively accurate navigation of the actual.

So what I think it boils down to is “Are the foundational concepts reliable?”

Kent:  More importantly are the foundational concepts useful?

John:  Right I think both useful and reliable are essential. I think usefulness isn’t really possible without them being reliable.

But if a base concept isn’t a really good translation of what’s actual as it relates to navigating reality, then would any subtype of that specific concept be likely to be better at it?

Kent:  Your example was near versus far. Other languages have several different variations which roughly translate very near, very far. But the words are always used interchangeably. They are not useful for basic communication, but they add to the richness…of language, rhyming, enhance cleverness…

But you may be referring to concepts like the horizon being the end of the earth. Did it harm anyone to not find the edge? Or when the earth was the center of the universe were we in worse shape scientifically because the fact was different?

I say we are wrong about everything to some extent. That the only yardstick we can go by is usefulness.

John:  I agree, but I think it’s a bit of both. Like “edge” is closer to foundational, but “edge of the Earth” is more a subtype of “edge”. I think “edge” is a kind of shape-related concept. But this is SE, so I’m trying to keep this within a question-based framework. I use high-disclosure which is a bit abnormal for SE, so I’ll break from that even when I’m doing SE.

But I’m trying to make sure I’m keeping it fairly question-oriented because of it being SE here. So that’s why I am bringing it back to a question, which was:  If a base concept isn’t a really good translation of what’s actual as it relates to navigating reality, then would any subtype of that specific concept be likely to be better at it?

Kent:  If the base concept is wrong to some extent (as they all are) you will eventually discover problems with your conceptual reality. The example I gave was NOT finding the edge of the earth.

From that point we become confused and look for a base concept that explains why there is no edge.

John :  I agree.  I get how it limits the lens to being from a series of single points in time in space, and everything is framed in relationship to us.

But wouldn’t that keep us from getting too far off from what the “actual” is? As in wouldn’t that make a lot of concepts have to be really good translations of “actual” in terms of how we navigationally engage with it?

Kent:  The concepts are all models of the real order that pre-exists our discovery of that order. All models are necessarily inaccurate and incomplete.

John: I agree they all are inaccurate and incomplete, but would that keep them from being good translations in terms of how we navigationally engage with what’s actual?

Kent:  Models are all we have. And some are better than others. There is no alternative. It is like saying that breathing air is a good way to get oxygen. I know of no other viable alternative to models.